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State Regulation of Motion Picture
Distributors
I. Introduction
The motion picture distribution industry is controlled by a
small number of major distributors who license their films to numerous independent exhibitors.1 These exhibitors include owners of individual local theaters and regional theater chains. Licensing arrangements between the economically powerful
distributors and the relatively less economically powerful theater
owners have become the focus of protective trade regulation
statutes in a number of states.2 In their least restrictive form,
the state statutes prohibit the distribution practice of "blind
bidding," a procedure that requires exhibitors to bid on films
without seeing the completed product.8 The more restrictive
state statutes regulate the entire bidding process and restrict the
distributors' ability to negotiate the most favorable terms for
guarantees and advances.
1. In 1978, the following major producer-distributors controlled 94% of the motion
picture distribution market: Avco Embassy Pictures Corp., Buena Vista Distribution Co.,
Inc., Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., Metro Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. (not currently a
distributor), Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century Fox Films Corp., United
Artists Corp., Universal Pictures Division of Universal City Studios, Inc., Universal Film
Exchanges Inc., Warner Bros., Inc., Warner Bros. Distributing Corp. The remainder of
the market consists of foreign and small independent domestic distributors. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 413 (S.D. Ohio 1980), affd in part,
remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
2. Motion pictures are not sold to exhibitors. The copyrighted motion pictures are
licensed to theater owners who bid or negotiate for exhibition rights. Motion pictures are
high risk, high profit enterprises, in part, because of the difficulty in predicting public
acceptance and box office revenues. Distributors attempt to share the financial risk with
exhibitors by obtaining as favorable terms as possible. Id. at 415. See infra note 24 for a
list of the states that have enacted legislation regulating motion picture distribution.
3. Typically, some months prior to completion and release of a film, potential exhibitors are sent information about the plot, actors, script, and director. Bids are solicited
from the exhibitors on the basis of the information supplied. Whether the information
supplied is adequate for the exhibitors to make an informed assessment of the film's box
office potential is a matter of much controversy. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying
text.
4. A guarantee is a minimum payment that the exhibitor agrees to make to the dis-
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As more states enacted prohibitions against blind bidding of
motion pictures, litigation by distributors challenging state regulation of the industry has increased. This comment examines
the regulation of bidding practices in the industry, beginning
with the landmark Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Paramount PicturesInc.;' the state statutes, 7 particularly those
of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah, that have been the subject of
litigation; and the court decisions in Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Rhodes,8 Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh,9 and Warner Bros. Inc. v. Wilkinson.0 This comment
concludes that state regulation of motion picture distribution, as
it applies to the regulation of the bidding process, is a valid exercise of state power, does not infringe upon the distributors'
constitutional rights of free expression, and is not preempted by
federal copyright law. A different result may be reached, however, where a state statute restricts the terms of licensing agreements, thus potentially imposing undue burdens on interstate
11
commerce.
II.

Background

Regulation of blind bidding has had an erratic history. In
1940, under threat of antitrust litigation, five of eight major distributor regardless of the subsequent box office revenues. It is essentially a device for
shifting financial risk from the distributor to the exhibitor. The guarantee assures the
distributor a minimum return regardless of public acceptance of the film at the box office. An advance is a refundable pre-payment of the distributors share of anticipated box
office revenues. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 418.
5. In 1979, seven states had enacted statutes regulating motion picture distribution.
As of August 1982, eighteen states had such legislation. See infra notes 24, 26. By July
1982, three district court and two circuit court cases had been decided on the issue of
blind bidding. See infra notes 51-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
cases.
6. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
7. See infra notes 24, 26 and accompanying text for a description of the state
statutes.
8. 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), affd in part, remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656
(6th Cir. 1982).
9. 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981), remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
10. 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981).
11. But cf. Note, Blind Bidding and the Motion Picture Industry, 92 HARv. L. REV.
1128 (1979) (prohibiting blindbidding is not appropriate since there is no compelling
state interest, and prohibition of blind bidding would only make the industry less
efficient).
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tributors signed a consent decree" stipulating that they would
not blind bid films nor offer to license more than five motion
pictures in a single group, a practice known as block booking.'3
The decree further provided that if the three remaining distributors did not sign a similar consent decree by June 1, 1942, the
agreement binding the original five distributors would lapse.
The remaining three distributors did not sign by the specified
date and the decree prohibiting blind bidding and block booking
4
lapsed.1
In subsequent antitrust litigation against all eight distributors, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Paramount Pictures," sustained the trial court's finding that illegal
price fixing conspiracies existed horizontally between distribu-

tors and vertically between distributors and exhibitors." The
Court required the distributors to divest themselves of theater
ownership to the extent that they were involved in the conspira-

cies. As a result, the vertical integration of distributors and ex17
hibitors ended.
In addition to separating the distribution and exhibition
12. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. 323, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
13. The Supreme Court defined block booking as "the practice of licensing, or offering for license, one feature or group of features on condition that the exhibitor will also
license another feature or group of features released by the same distributor during a
given period." United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948).
14. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. at 333.
15. 334 U.S. 131 (1948), on remand, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
16. Price fixing among distributors was established by evidence of express agreements. Price fixing between distributors and exhibitors was inferred from the patterns of
price fixing in the trial record. The Supreme Court held that such price fixing combinations were per se violations of the Sherman Act. Citing United States v. General Electric,
272 U.S. 476 (1926), the distributors argued that because the owner of a patent could fix
the price at which a licensee must sell a patented article, the owner of a copyrighted
motion picture should have the same privilege. The Supreme Court disagreed and distinguished General Electric from Paramount. In General Electric a single patent was at
issue. In Paramount the distributors were attempting to regiment an entire industry
through price fixing, a practice the Supreme Court had previously held illegal in United
States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948).
17. Today the distribution and exhibition segments of the industry are separate.
The Motion Picture Association of America and the National Association of Theater
Owners are trade organizations that represent and lobby for distributors and exhibitors
respectively. See generally Cassady, Impact of the ParamountDecision on Motion Picture Distribution and Price Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REv. 150 (1958) (reviewing the increased competition resulting from the Paramount decision and concluding that it was
healthy for the industry, leading to better quality motion pictures).
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segments of the industry, the Paramount decision and subsequent decree prohibited the practice of "block booking": the licensing of one film on the condition that the exhibitor will also
agree to exhibit other films offered by the distributor in a given
period."8 Block booking was declared illegal because exhibitors
could not bid for a single film on its own merits, and because
such practice "adds to the monopoly of a single copyrighted picture that of another copyrighted picture which must be taken
and exhibited in order to secure the first."'" Blind bidding was
an integral part of block booking, for exhibitors were unable to
view some motion pictures in the block of films before having to
bid.
The decree that prohibited block booking, however, did not
totally prohibit blind bidding. Blind bidding was regulated to
the extent that exhibitors could reject 20% of films licensed
when blind bidding for two or more films.2 There was no restriction on the blind bidding of single films. As a result, blind
bidding increased until 1968, when the Justice Department and
the major distributors entered into an agreement limiting to
three the number of films that could be blind bid each year.2 '
When the agreement expired in 1975, the Justice Department
was moving toward deregulation of the motion picture industry.
Thus, continued federal regulation of blind bidding practices
through consent decrees was not pursued.2 Consequently, blind
bidding rapidly increased; by 1977, 60% (United Artists) to 91%
18. The Paramount trial court found that block booking was a common industry
practice. Generally, exhibitors only had a description of the block of films for which they
had contracted. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 66 F. Supp. at 348-49.
19. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157, (quoting United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 66 F.Supp. at 349). Finding that the exclusive rights granted by the
Copyright Act did not include extending the right to other works whether or not they
were copyrighted, the Supreme Court sustained the prohibition against.block booking.
Id.
20. Blind bidding was not directly addressed in the Paramount decision. The trial
court decree provided, however, that exhibitors could reject 20% of blind bid films.
"Blind-selling [bidding] does not appear to be as inherently restrictive of competition as
block-booking, although it is capable of some abuse." Id. at 157 n.11. The Supreme
Court approved the provision allowing exhibitors to reject 20% of blind bid films. Id.
21. United States v. Paramount Pictures, No. 87-273 (S.D.N.Y. filed August 14,
1968, renewed June 1, 1971).
22. Note, Blind Bidding in the Motion Picture Industry, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1128,
1136 n.36 (1979).
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(Columbia) of first run films were being blind bid.2"
With federal deregulation, the economic and risk sharing
struggle between distributors and exhibitors continued in state
legislatures. Lobbying efforts by the National Association of
Theater Owners has helped enact statutes prohibiting blind bidding in eighteen states. Most state statutes, in addition to
prohibiting blind bidding, regulate the motion picture bidding
2' 5
process to insure "fair and open bidding procedures.
III.

The Statutes Regulating Motion Picture Distribution

The eighteen state statutes regulating motion picture distribution all have similar provisions.2' Essentially all are trade regulation statutes aimed at insuring fair competition, preventing
abuses in the bidding process, and correcting the perceived disparity in bargaining power between distributors and exhibitors.
23. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 417 (S.D. Ohio 1980),
aff'd in part, remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
24. The following states have enacted statutes regulating the distribution of motion
pictures. (The list of states differs slightly from those listed in Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d at 659 n.2. New York, Oklahoma, and Missouri statutes were
not found. Information received verbally from the National Association of Theater Owners indicated that New York and Oklahoma do not have blind bidding statutes. Oregon
has a blind bidding statute that was not noted in the opinion. A blind bidding statute in
Missouri became effective August 13, 1982.)
STATE
CODIFICATION
Alabama
ALA. CODE § 8-18 (Supp. 1981).
Georgia
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-290 (1981).
Idaho
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7701-7708 (Supp. 1982).
Louisiana
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2901 (West Supp. 1982).
Maine
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1901 (Supp. 1981-82).

ch. 93F, § 1-4 (West Supp. 1982).

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.

Missouri
New Mexico
Ohio
N. Carolina
Oregon
Pennsylvania
S. Carolina

Statute effective August 13, 1982.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-5 (1978).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.05-.07 (Page 1979 & Supp. 1981).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75C (1981).
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.890 (1981).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203 (Supp. 1982).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981).

Tennessee
Utah

TENN. CODE ANN. §
UTAH CODE ANN. §

69-801 (Supp. 1981).
13-13 (Supp. 1981).

§ 59.1-255 (1982).
§ 19.58 (Supp. 1982).
W. Virginia
W. VA. CODE § 47-11D (1980).
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-291 (1981).
Virginia

VA.

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

CODE

26.The following chart illustrates the general provisions of the state statutes:
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Four types of regulation have been adopted by the states: (1)
prohibition of blind bidding; (2) prohibition of advances to the
distributor by the exhibitor prior to the showing of the picture;
(3) prohibition of guarantees to the distributor if he shares in
box office receipts; and (4) limitations on the length of run of
any exclusive or exclusive multiple first runs of a motion picture.
Three state statutes, to date, have received judicial review:
Ohio's statute 7 in Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes,2"
Pennsylvania's statute2 9 in Associated Film Distribution Corp.
v. Thornburgh,0 and Utah's statute"' in Warner Bros., Inc. v.
Wilkinson.2 Of these three statutes litigated to date, Pennsylvania's statute3 is the most comprehensive. Pennsylvania prohib-

State

Prohibits
Blind Bids
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Alabama
Georgia
Idaho
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
New Mexico
N. Carolina
Ohio
Penn.
S. Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Virginia
Washington
W. Virginia

27. OHIo

REV. CODE ANN.

Regulates
Bid Process

Restricts
Guarantees

Restricts
Advances

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

1333.05-.07 (Page 1979 & Supp. 1981).

28. 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 679 F. 2d
656 (6th Cir. 1982).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
30. 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981), remanded, 683 F. 2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
31. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-13 (Supp. 1981).
32. 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981), dismissed without prejudice, No. 81-1692
(10th Cir. March 5, 1982).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203 (Purdon Supp. 1982). The Pennsylvania legislature
included its findings and purposes in the statute:
§ 203-2. Legislative findings and purposes
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania finds and declares
that the licensing and distribution of feature motion pictures to theatres in this
Commonwealth, including the rights and obligations of distributors and exhibitors, vitally affects the general economy as well as the access of the public to
works of artistic expression and opinion. In order to promote the public interest
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its blind bidding, 4 advances,3 5 and, where the distributor shares
in a percentage of box office revenues, guarantees.3 6 Addition-

and public welfare of this Commonwealth to:
(1) insure unabridged access for the public to artistic expression and opinion
in feature motion pictures at reasonable prices and at many different locations;
(2) avoid undue control of the exhibitors by the distributors;
(3) foster vigorous and healthy competition in offering feature motion pictures for the benefit of the public by prohibiting practices through which fair an
honest competition is restrained, destroyed or inhibited;
(4) promote the wide geographical dissemination at reasonable prices to the
public of ideas, opinions and artistic expression in feature motion pictures;
(5) prevent delay in the exhibition of feature motion pictures to the public in
theatres playing subsequent to the first run showing;
(6) prevent theatres from unnecessarily going out of business, thereby resulting in reducing the number of small independent businesses and unemployment
with losses of tax revenues and other undesirable consequences;
(7) prevent unfair and deceptive acts or practices and unreasonable restraints
of trade in the business of distribution and exhibition of feature motion pictures
within the Commonwealth:
(8) promote fair and effective competition in that business;
(9) benefit the movie going public by limiting the long and extensive first runs
so that additional theatres, in a given area, may also exhibit the same feature
motion picture and at possibly a lower admission price; and
(10) prohibit blind bidding by insuring that exhibitors have the opportunity
to view a motion picture and know its contents before committing themselves to
exhibit it in their communities ....
Id. § 203-2. The pertinent parts of Pennsylvania's Feature Motion Picture Fair Business
Practice Law appear infra notes 34-38.
34. § 203-4. Blind bidding
Blind bidding is hereby prohibited within the Commonwealth. No negotiations between exhibitors and distributors for the licensing or exhibition of a
feature motion picture shall take place and no license agreement or any of its
terms shall be agreed to for the exhibition of any feature motion picture within
the Commonwealth before the feature motion picture has been trade screened
within the Commonwealth.
Id. § 203-4.
35. § 203-6 Advances
(a) Advances prohibited. - It shall be unlawful for any license agreement for
the exhibition of a feature motion picture at a theatre within the Commonwealth to contain or be conditioned upon a provision, agreement or understanding that the exhibitor shall advance any funds prior to the exhibition of
the picture as security for the performance of the license agreement or to be
applied to payments under such an agreement.
(b) Prohibited advances void.- Any provision, agreement or understanding
which provides for such an advance shall be void and any purported waiver of
the prohibition in subsection (a) shall be void and unenforceable.
Id. § 203-6.
36. § 203-5. Guarantees
(a) Minimum payment to distributor.- It shall be unlawful for any license
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ally, Pennsylvania regulates the bidding process"7 and length of
first runs.3 8 Ohio's statute"9 prohibits blind bidding"0 and regu-

agreement which provides for a fee or other payment to the distributor based
in whole or in part on the attendance or the box office receipts at a theatre
within the Commonwealth to contain or be conditioned upon a guarantee of a
minimum payment to the distributor.
(b) Prohibited guarantees void.- Any provision, agreement or understanding
which provides for such a guarantee shall be void and any purported waiver of
the prohibition in subsection (a) shall be void and unenforceable.
Id. 203-5.
37. § 203-8. Bidding Procedures
(a) Invitation to bid contents - If bids are solicited from exhibitors for the
licensing of a feature motion picture within the Commonwealth, then the invitation to bid shall specify the following:
(1) Whether the run for which the bid is being solicited is a first, second or
subsequent run; whether the run is an exclusive or non-exclusive run; and the
geographical area for the run.
(2) The names of all exhibitors who are being solicited.
(3) The date and hour the invitation to bid expires.
(4) The time, date, name and address of the location where the bids will be
opened, which location shall be in the exchange centers of this Commonwealth.
(b) Trade screening - If the motion picture that is the subject of a bid has not
already been trade screened within the exchange centers in this Commonwealth, the distributor soliciting the bid shall include in the invitation to bid,
the date, time and location of the trade screening for such picture.
(c) Bid submission and opening - All bids shall be submitted in writing and
shall be opened at the same time and in the presence of those exhibitors, or
their agents, who submitted bids and are present at such time.
(d) Examination of bids - Any exhibitor, or the agent of an exhibitor, who
submits a bid for a particular run of a feature motion picture may, at reasonable times within 60 days after a bid is opened, examine any bid that is made
for the same run of the motion picture by another exhibitor. The exhibitor
may examine the bids even if the distributor rejects all bids that are submitted. Within seven business days after a bid for a particular run of a feature
motion picture is accepted, the distributor shall notify in writing each exhibitor who submitted a bid for that run, the terms of the accepted bid and the
identity of the successful bidder.
(e) Rejection of all bids - If a distributor issues invitations to bid for a feature
motion picture and rejects all bids received, he shall not enter into a license
agreement for the exhibition of the picture except by means of the bidding
process specified in this section. If the distributor rejects all bids submitted
pursuant to the invitation to bid, he shall notify all exhibitors who submitted
bids that he rejected all the bids and shall issue a new invitation to bid.
Id. § 203-8.
38. §203-7. Length of Run
No license agreement shall be entered into between distributor and exhibitor to
grant an exclusive first run or an exclusive multiple first run for more than 42
days without provision to expand the run to second run or subsequent run theatres within the geographical area and license agreements and prints of said feature
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lates the bidding process,

1

115

but its other provisions are slightly

motion picture shall be made available by the distributor to those subsequent run
theatres that would normally be served on subsequent run availability.
39. OfIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.05 -.07 (Page 1979 & Supp. 1981). The pertinent
parts of Ohio's Motion Picture License Agreements are reproduced below and infra note
41.
§ 1333.06 [certain practices of distributors prohibited: effect on license
agreements].
(A) No distributor shall engage in blind bidding.
(B) No distributor shall condition the granting or execution of a license agreement on a guarantee of a minimum payment to the distributor, if the exhibitor is
required by the license agreement to make any payment to the distributor that is
based on the attendance or the box office receipts at a theater at which the motion
picture is exhibited.
(C) No distributor shall condition the granting or execution of a license agreement on the exhibitor's advancing, more than 14 days prior to his first exhibition
of a motion picture, any money that is to be used as security for the exhibitor's
performance of the license agreement or is to be applied to any payments that the
exhibitor is required by the agreement to make to the distributor.
(D) Any provision of a license agreement that waives any of the prohibitions
of, or fails to comply with, this section or section 1333.07 of the Revised Code is
void and unenforceable. Any license agreement that fails to comply with this section and section 1333.07 of the Revised Code is voidable by the exhibitor, if the
exhibitor gives the distributor written notice, prior to the exhibitor's first exhibition of the motion picture that is the subject of the agreement, of his intent to
have the agreement voided.
40. Id. § 1333.06(A). See supra note 39.
41. § 1333.07 [Invitations to exhibitors to bid: inspection, notice].
(A) If bids are solicited from exhibitors for the purpose of entering into a
license agreement, the invitation to bid shall specify:
(1) The number and length of runs to which the invitation to bid applies;
(2) Whether the invitation to bid applies to a first or subsequent run;
(3) The geographic area for each run;
(4) The names of all exhibitors who are being given an invitation to bid;
(5) The date, hour, and location at which the bid is required to be made;
(6) The name and address of the location where the bids will be opened,
which location shall be within this state.
(B) If the motion picture that is the subject of a bid has not already been
trade screened within the state, the distributor soliciting the bid shall include
in the invitation to bid the date, time, and location of the trade screening of
the motion picture that is the subject of the invitation to bid.
(C) Every distributor shall furnish to all exhibitors in this state reasonable
and uniform notice of all trade screenings that are held within this state of
motion pictures that he is distributing.
(D) All bids shall be submitted to the distributor in written form. The distributor or his agent shall open all bids at the same time and in the presence of at
least one of the exhibitors, or the agent of an exhibitor, who has submitted a
bid.
(E) Any exhibitor, or the agent of an exhibitor, who submits a bid for a particular run of a motion picture may, at reasonable times within 60 days after
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different than the Pennsylvania statute. Ohio does not prohibit
guarantees; distributors, however, are not permitted to demand
guarantees as a condition of the exhibition license. 42 In Ohio, advances may not be made more than fourteen days prior to the
first showing of the film. 43 Utah's statute" prohibits blind bidding4 5 and, if the distributor shares in the box office receipts, it
also prohibits guarantees."
The need for such statutes and their impact on the motion
picture industry are matters of great controversy. Distributors
maintain "that blind bidding is necessary to stabilize the eco-

the bid is opened, examine any bid that is made for the same run of the motion picture by another exhibitor. The exhibitor may inspect the bids even if
the distributor rejects all bids that are submitted. Within seven business days
after a bid for a particular run of a motion picture is accepted, the distributor
shall notify in writing each exhibitor who submitted a bid for that run of the
motion picture of the terms of the accepted bid and the identity of the successful bidder. Any bid submitted is nonreturnable.
(F) If a distributor issues invitations to bid for a motion picture, he shall not
enter into a license agreement for the exhibition of a motion picture except by
means of the bidding process specified in this section. If the distributor rejects
all bids submitted pursuant to an invitation to bid, he shall notify all exhibitors who submitted bids that he rejected all bids and shall issue a new invitation to bid.
Id. § 1333.07.
42. Id. § 1333.06(B). See supra note 39.
43. Id. § 1333.06(C). See supra note 39.
44. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-13 (Supp. 1981). The pertinent parts of Utah's Motion
Picture Fair Bidding Act are reproduced below:
§ 13-13-3 Blind bidding prohibited. No distributor shall engage in blind
bidding.
§ 13-13-4 Payment of percentage of receipts. If an exhibitor is required by a
license agreement to make any payment to the distributor that is based on a
percentage of the theater box office receipts the license agreement shall not
require a guarantee of a minimum payment to the distributor or require the
exhibitor to charge any per capita amount for ticket sales.
§ 13-13-5 Bids - Contents. If bids are solicited from exhibitors for the purpose
of entering into a license agreement, the bid shall include in the invitation to
bid the date, time and location of the trade screening of the motion picture
that is the subject of the invitation to bid.
§ 13-13-6 Provisions waiving or violating act void. Any provision of an invitation to bid or a license agreement that waives any of the prohibitions of or fails
to comply with this act is void and unenforceable.
Id.
45. Id. § 13-13-3. See supra note 44.
46. Id. § 13-13-4. See supra note 44. Utah's statute, the least restrictive that has
undergone judicial review, does not regulate advances.
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' With
nomics of motion picture production and distribution."47
blind bidding, distributors can release a film shortly after completion and do so simultaneously in many theaters. Such an arrangement generally affords the best return on the producer-distributor's financial investment because film advertising and
promotion of ancillary items, such as books and record albums,
can be coordinated over a wide area. In addition, blind bidding
affords an earlier release date than if a completed film must be
first screened for theater owners. The earlier release date means
the film will begin to recoup its production and distribution
costs more quickly. Further, distributors contend that imposition of bidding procedures increases their costs and discourages
48

investment in new films.

One advocate of blind bidding and guarantees finds the
shifting of risk from distributor to exhibitor to be reasonable
and fair:
[B]ecause the distributor is often in an equally blind position
when he agrees to underwrite or distribute an unproduced film, it
does not seem unreasonable for him to demand that the exhibitor
share some of the risk ....

[W]hile it is understandable that

exhibitors wish to be in the position to "make their own mistakes" it is possible that they will, for the most part, make the
same mistakes whether under a blind bidding or trade screening
system.4 9
Exhibitors, viewing blind bidding as unfair,
have complained that the practice [of blind bidding] has contributed to the substantial decline of their industry and, even in the
short run, leaves them in the position of having commitments to
unexpectedly bad pictures and playing to empty houses for long
durations.50
Whether blind bidding is unfair and prejudicial to open compe47. Cohen, Abolition of an Unfair Business Practice - Anti-Blind Bidding Statute
for the Motion Picture Industry, 26 MASS. L. REV. 239, 239 (1979).
48. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 416-17 (S.D. Ohio
1980), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
49. Note, Blind Bidding and the Motion Picture Industry, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1128,
1133 (1979).
50. Cohen, Abolition of Unfair Business Practice - Anti-Blind Bidding Statute for
the Motion Picture Industry, 65 MASS. L. REv. 239, 239 (1979).
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tition, as the exibitors contend, or whether it benefits the entire
industry and the viewing public, as the distributors maintain,
are factual issues that were fully explored for the first time when
the Ohio statute was litigated.
IV.

Legal and Factual Issues at Trial

Distributors have challenged statutes in Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Utah that regulate motion picture distribution. Distributors
complained that the statutes violate substantive due process,
first amendment guarantees of freedom of expression, federal
copyright laws, the commerce clause of the Constitution, and
federal antitrust laws. Not all of these issues were reached by
each court; in each case, however, the arguments put forth by
the distributor-plaintiffs were similar.
A.

Substantive Due Process

In Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes," the distributors
complained that the Ohio statute was unconstitutional because
it did not rationally relate to any legitimate governmental interest or further any legitimate governmental objective.52 The Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio applied a
low level of scrutiny to the Ohio statute, finding that "substantive due process requires economic regulation to meet a fairly
minimal standard. ' ' 53 Since no purpose was stated in the Ohio

statute, the court examined and accepted the State's argument
that the statute met a legitimate state interest in eliminating economic abuses,5 4 and in maximizing a financial return to an industry within the state." The district court found that the Ohio
statute was carefully drawn to "effect a better balance of bargaining power between exhibitors and producer/distributors by
the prohibition of risk shifting devices [e.g., blind bidding and
51. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F.Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd
in part, remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 428.
53. The court quoted from Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934). "If the
laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to proper legislative purpose and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied .
Id.
54. Id. at 429 (citing Ferguson v. Skruppa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963)).
55. Id. at 429 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
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guarantees]." 50 Thus, there was no due process violation because
a rationale nexus existed between the Ohio statute and a legitimate state interest.
In Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson," the distributors
claimed that section 4 of the Utah Act, which prohibits guarantees if the distributors receive a percentage of the box office revenues, 5 was an unreasonable interference with their ability to
contract, thereby restricting competition and unconstitutionally
abridging their "liberty of contract."" The Federal District
Court for the District of Utah found the contract limitation imposed by the Utah statute requiring a distributor to choose between a guaranteed minimum payment or a percentage of the
box office receipts to be reasonable. 0 The court decided that the
statute, instead of restricting competition, "in fact . . . [preserved] and [fostered] competition, stemming the flow of eco-

nomic concentration, and limiting monopoly and its fruits."' 1
Since the distributors had not met the burden of demonstrating
that the Utah legislature had acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way, or that the statute did not serve a legitimate state interest,

the court found it to be constitutional.6
D.

First Amendment Guarantee of Freedom of Expression

The distributor-plaintiffs in Allied Artists complained that
the Ohio statute violated their first amendment rights of free
56. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 429. The court reached
the canclusion that the Ohio statute was legitimately and carefully drawn by examining
the effect prior industry practices had on Ohio exhibitors. It was determined that the
Ohio exhibitors were at a substantial disadvantage when dealing with distributors under
such practices. The Ohio statute was analogized to a California statute upheld by the
Supreme Court in New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S.
96 (1978). There, the California statute "corrected a disparity in bargaining power between local automobile manufacturers and dealers .
Id. at 100-101.
57. 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981).
58. See supra note 44 for regulation of guarantees in the Utah statute.
59. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. at 109.
60. Id. "It [section 4 of the Utah act] is a rational effort on the part of the legislature to maintain a semblance of sense in distribution in an industry not particularly
noted for rationality." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 110. The Warner Bros. court quoted Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976): "[T]he burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to
establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." Id.

13

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:107

expression. They contended that since motion pictures are protected forms of expression and the Ohio statute had a direct and
immediate impact on their films, strict judicial scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review." The district court noted that
motion pictures are protected forms of expression under the first
amendment,6" however, such protection was not absolute; 65 the
level of scrutiny was lower for a statute dealing with economic
regulation than for a statute dealing with the content of protected speech. 6
The court decided that the Ohio statute came within the
category of "general regulatory statutes not intended to control
the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise. "67 Such statutes, the court reasoned, should be upheld
when "justified by subordinating valid governmental inter-

ests."'

Employing the balancing test established by the Su-

preme Court in United States v. O'Brien,"' the district court examined the three specific adverse impacts that the distributors
claimed were being imposed on them by the Ohio statute: delay
in releasing films; foreclosure of access to Ohio markets; and reduction in quantity, quality, and diversity of films.
Finding a risk of delay in releasing motion pictures, and acknowledging that such a delay was an abridgment of plaintiffs'
freedom of expression, the court nonetheless decided the risk

was minimal, and was properly subordinate to a legitimate gov63. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F.Supp. at 432.
64. Id. at 432 (citing Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968); United
States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948)).
65. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 432 (citing Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)).
66. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 433. The Supreme Court
established the following balancing test for first amendment issues:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government: if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest if the governmental interest; is unrelated to the supression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
67. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 433 (quoting Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961)).
68. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 433 (quoting Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 336 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961)).
69. 391 U.S. 367, 377, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968). See supra note 66 for the
test in O'Brien.
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ernmental interest. 70 Further, the distributors had no first
amendment right to market their films in the most financially
rewarding manner. The court found no convincing testimony
that distributors would have less access to Ohio markets under
the statute than they had before it was enacted. There was no
evidence indicating that the Ohio statute would have an impact
on industry decisions regarding the kind, number, and caliber of
motion pictures produced. After balancing the incidental restriction on distributors' freedom of expression against the legitimate
state interests developed at trial, the district court held that the
Ohio statute did not infringe distributors' first amendment
rights.7 1
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh,7 '

granted summary judgment and held that the Pennsylvania
statute, on its face, violated the distributors' first amendment
rights of free expression.73 The Pennsylvania statute was also
subjected to the O'Brien test, but yielded the opposite result
from the Allied Artists scrutiny of the Ohio statute.7 4 The court
found that the purposes contained in the Pennsylvania statute"8
were not substantial governmental interests and thus did not
meet the O'Brien criteria.7
The court decided that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
level of judicial review for first amendment issues.7 7 Further,

70. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 433-34. The court found
the following legitimate government interests from the testimony: readjusting the relative market strengths of exhibitors and distributors; establishing fair and open bidding
practices; and removing opportunities for unfair dealing. Id. at 435.
71. Id. at 435.
72. 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981), remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3rd. Cir. 1982).
73. Id. at 996.
74. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 33 for the purposes of the Pennsylvania statute.
76. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 986. See
supra note 66 for the test in O'Brien.
77. The court found support for strict scrutiny in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65
(1975). "[T]his type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the excercise
of First Amendment rights arises.., indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of
the government's conduct .... " Id. The court also relied upon Citizens For a Better
Environment v. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
(ordinance barring solicitation of contributions unless 75% of receipts are used for charitable purposes, held a violation of first amendment); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (requirement that newspapers provide access for opposing
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first amendment protection extended to the means of distribution, not merely the content of the film. 78 Since the Pennsylvania statute regulated the distribution of motion pictures by
imposing conditions on the licensing process, it was unconstitutional for the same reason that a statute regulating the means of
distribution of newspapers was held unconstitutional: the statute imposed an indirect restraint on freedom of expression.7 9
The court also found that the prohibition of blind bidding
caused a risk of delay in releasing motion pictures for exhibition,
which was sufficient to make the act unconstitutional." The
court specifically noted that statutes that inhibit freedom of expression by creating financial risk have been held to be unconstitutional.8 1 Further, the court concluded that although the Pennsylvania statute was overbroad, its purposes "might well be valid
and support another, more limited regulation,
possibly one more
2
closely resembling the Ohio statute."'

C.

Copyright Preemption

The distributors in Allied Artists alleged that the Ohio statute deprived them of their rights under the federal Copyright
Act. 8 Specifically, they argued that the Ohio statute was preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act,8 article I, section 8
editorial views, held a first amendment violation because newspapers might limit their
editorial content to less controversial subjects); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965) (state statute that required films be submitted to state censor before showing
created an unconstitutional risk of delay).
78. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 982 (citing
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Borough Council of Swathmore, 381 F. Supp. 228, 241
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (town ordinance prohibiting the placement of newspaper boxes on a public street was not constitutional because it affected the means of distributing protected
expression)).
79. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 981-83.
80. Id. at 984. The court decided that the Supreme Court had spoken definitively on
the risk of delay in licensing motion pictures in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965). The statute in Freedman was held unconstitutional because of the delay in exhibition after the films were submitted to the State Board of Censors.
81. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 982 (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1976) (statute that infringed on freedom of speech
by imposing limitations on campaign expenditures by candidates for public office held
unconstitutional)).
82. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 988-89.
83. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979 and Supp. IV 1980).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. III 1979) provides for preemption of state statutes and
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of the Constitution granting copyrights, 8 and the supremacy
clause in article VI of the Constitution.86 Further, they contended that the Ohio statute "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
87
of Congress.
Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state law that is
equivalent to any of the rights granted in section 106 of the Copyright Act.8 8 The district court's analysis in Allied Artists employed "a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction
of the two statutes and then determining whether they [were] in
conflict."8 9 The court first examined whether the Ohio statute
"creates, grants, or destroys any rights that are equivalent to the
exclusive rights of copyright set forth in [section] 106. ''90 Rather

common law that create legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights granted under the Copyright Act.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. grants Congress the power "[tjo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
86. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, establishes the Constitution as "[tihe supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
87. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 441 (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). The district court in Allied Artists examined the
legislative history of the Copyright Act, contained in H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5747, and decided that Congress limited preemption only to those State laws that were within the scope of the
Copyright Act. Id. at 442-43. The court found that Congress intended to permit the
States to establish laws that might affect the exercise of copyright, as long as the subject
matter of the State statutes was not directed to copyright infringement. Id. at 444.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. III 1979):
[T]he owner of the copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographed works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and . . . individual images of motion pictures or other audiovisual
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
Id.
89. Allied Artists Pictures Corp v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 441 (quoting Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971)).
90. Id. at 443. The district court in Allied Artists examined each of the exclusive

17

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:107

than depriving the distributors of the protection of section 106,
the court found that the Ohio statute, by providing licensing
procedures, recognized the distributors' right to grant exclusive
licenses to exhibitors.91 Thus, the Ohio statute was held not to
be in conflict with section 106 of the Copyright Act.
Having reconciled section 106 of the Copyright Act with the
Ohio statute, the court turned to the distributors' complaint
that the Ohio statute was an obstacle to accomplishing the
objectives that Congress sought in enacting the copyright law.
Four arguments were put forth by the distributors. First, their
right to distribute copies of their films was impeded by the Ohio
provision that guarantees cannot be a condition of granting an
exhibition license. Second, their ability to license films on the
best terms was restricted by the Ohio provision that prohibits
negotiation for a license if all bids are rejected. Third, the blind
bidding prohibition did not permit distributors to license their
films under optimum circumstances. Fourth, the requirement to
trade screen their films destroyed their right to chose whether or
not to perform by making performance a condition of granting a
license."
The court considered the first three objections together and
decided that the distributors had no right under the Copyright
Act to market their product in a manner most favorable to
them.9a Relying on two Supreme Court decisions," the court
fund that states have the authority to regulate market practices
dealing with copyrighted subject matter.' 5 Although the copyright owner could not be forced to perform his work, the court
found nothing in the Ohio statute that compelled distributors to
rights granted by section 106 of the Copyright Act and each provision of the Ohio statute. It found nothing in the Ohio statute that created or destroyed any rights equivalent
to those in section 106 of the Copyright Act. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 445.
93. Id. at 446.

94. Id. at 447. The court relied on Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941) and Fox
Films v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932), which together held that rights granted by the Copyright Act do not preclude a state from regulating the marketing of copyrighted products
nor does the copyright owner have the right to distribute the product in the manner he
deems most desirable.
95. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 447.
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trade screen their films." Rather, the court decided that the
provisions of the Ohio statute affected the distributors only after
they had already decided to market their films in Ohio. 97 Thus,
they retained full control over their copyrighted films, and there
was no conflict between the Ohio statute and the objectives of
Congress." s
In Associated Film DistributionCorp. v. Thornburgh," distributors put forth the same argument in attacking the Pennsylvania statute as was made in the challenge to the Ohio statute.
They maintained that the Pennsylvania statute conflicted with
their rights under the Copyright Law and thus stood as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress in enacting the law. The district court found that the Pennsylvania statute "substantially
restricts the conditions under which a copyright holder may distribute and license its work. . . . [I]ts regulation . . . interfers
with federally created rights granted by [section] 106 . . . in
ways the Ohio statute . . . does not."100 Specifically, the Penn-

sylvania statute was seen as more restrictive than its Ohio counterpart regarding advances, 10 1 guarantees, 10' and the terms of
the license.103 The court held that the provisions of the Pennsylvania statute so interfered with the distributors' exclusive right
to license and control their films, and with their right to choose
the means of distribution.1 0" Hence, the court held that the
Pennsylvania statute stood as an obstacle to the objectives of
96. Id.
97. Id. "The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration." Id. at 446 (quoting United States v. Paramount, 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948)).
98. Id. at 447.
99. 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981), remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
100. Id. at 994.
101. Id. See supra note 35. No advances were permitted in Pennsylvania. In Ohio,
advances were permitted but not more than 14 days before the showing of the film. Although the Ohio statute was less restrictive, it too would have been preempted by the
Associated Film Distributioncourt. "[T]he requirement... that an advance screening
This requirement, also
be held, requires the copyright holder to delay licensing ....
present in Ohio conflicts with section 106 [of the Copyright Act]." Id. at 995.
102. See supra note 36. No guarantees were permitted in Pennsylvania. Guarantees
were permitted in Ohio if they were not a condition of the license.
103. See supra note 38. In Pennsylvania films must be rebid after 42 days. There is
no limit on the length of first runs in Ohio.
104. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 996.
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Congress, and was thus preempted by the Copyright Act.108
In Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson,10 6 the distributors challenged the provision of the Utah statute which prohibits guarantees if the distributor shares in a percentage of the box office
receipts.1 0 7 They argued that the Utah statute was preempted by
section 106 of the Copyright Act. The district court, in a brief
analysis, found no connection between the Utah statute and the
Copyright Act, stating:
The right to transfer or license copyrighted material for use by
others under sections 106 and 201 et seq. of the Copyright Act
has never encompassed a right to transfer the work at all times
and at all places free and clear of all regulation; it has meant that
the copyright owner has the exclusive right to transfer the material for a consideration to others.106
D.

The Commerce Clause

The distributors in Allied Artists contended that the Ohio
statute attempted to deprive interstate commerce of its national
uniformity, discriminated against interstate commerce, and imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce. Specifically, the
distributors maintained that blind bidding statutes force the industry to deal with "a welter of varying or conflicting state regulations which will virtually destroy their ability to operate efficiently and effectively on a national basis."10 9 The district court
found the evidence insufficient to conclude that the flow of interstate commerce would be impeded. It did note that all the
state statutes banning blind bidding were similar in their provisions, and the court found nothing to show that the distributors
would be prevented from operating efficiently on a national
scale. 10
The district court found no discrimination against interstate
commerce since all distributors were treated equally under the
Ohio statute.1 If there were Ohio distributors, they would be
105. Id.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981).
Id. at 106. See supra note 44 for the provisions of the Utah statute.
Id. at 108.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 436.
Id. at 436 n. 17.
Id. at 437.
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subject to the same provisions as the out of state distributors."'
The court found that the only burden demonstrated at trial was
the minor delay in the release of some films attributed to the
requirement for a trade screening." 8 It found such a burden permissible in view of the benefits of the Ohio statute.14
The district court in Associated Film Distribution did not
reach the commerce clause issue, having granted summary judgment on the first amendment and copyright questions."15 The
district court in Warner Bros. found evidence in the hearing record sufficient to demonstrate that the Utah statute was not an
unreasonable
or discriminatory burden on interstate
6
commerce."
E. Antitrust Violation
The distributors in Allied Artists charged that the Ohio
statute required certain collusive conduct among exhibitors in
violation of federal antitrust laws,1' 7 and was therefore preempted by the supremacy clause of the Constitution. 18 The distributor-plaintiffs alleged three violations. First, the Ohio statute encouraged exhibitors to agree to allocate films among
themselves. Second, the open bidding procedures interfered with
pricing behavior of the exhibitors because each exhibitor could
compare the terms offered after the bids are opened. Third, restricting guarantees limited competition by negating a competitive tool. The court found that the-Sherman Act" 9 would be violated only "if there is established joint conduct among
1'
participating exhibitors which unreasonably restrains trade.

0

2

Since the Ohio statute did not require or approve collusive conduct, the court decided that hypothetical conduct put forth by
112. Id.
113. Id. at 438.
114. Id. at 439.
115. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 996. See
supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
116. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. at 439. See supra notes 57-62
and accompanying text.
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 13, 13a (1976, Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV 1980).
118. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 448.
119. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
120. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 448.
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the distributors was not sufficient to establish a violation of the
Sherman Act.12 1 Disclosure of bid terms to all competitors was
not viewed as anticompetitive unless the exhibitors used that information to limit competition.1 2 2 Absent any evidence of such
activity, the court found the 'disclosure of bid terms acceptable." s Further, restriction on guarantees were determined not
to be anticompetitive. ' 4 Guarantees were only prohibited when
the distributors' demand for them was combined with a demand
to participate in a percentage of the box office receipts."" The
court found that the guarantee restriction actually fostered competition because it precluded large exhibitors from offering substantial guarantees for the best films, thus forcing out smaller
6
competitors."2
The district court in Warner Bros. found no antitrust violation in the Utah statute. The court referred to the Allied Artists
Utah statute enhanced, rather
decision and concluded that the
7
than restricted, competition.1"
V.

Appellate Decisions

The circuit court decision in Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Rhodes" held that those provisions of the Ohio statute concerned with state regulation of the bidding process did not deprive distributors of any protected rights, nor were they preempted by federal law."'2 The issue of whether restraints on the
terms of licensing agreements under the Ohio statute were valid
was remanded for further fact finding by the district court.' s

121. Id. The court noted that the concept of a hypothetical restraint of trade that
was being proposed by the distributors had been discredited by the Supreme Court in
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 131 (1978). Id. at 448-49.
122. Id. at 449.
123. Id. at 450.
124. Id. at 451.
125. Id. See OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.06(B) (Page 1979 & Supp. 1981) reprinted
supra in note 39.
126. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 451.
127. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. at 107.
128. 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982).
129. Id. at 662-63.
130. ld. at 665. The portion of the Ohio statute that was upheld was section 1333.06
(A) and (D) and section 1333.07. The portion of the statute remanded was section
1333.06 (B) and (C). See supra note 39 for the text of the Ohio statute.
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The circuit court decision in Associated Film DistributionCorp.
v. Thornburgh3 1 reversed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment that found the Pennsylvania statute defective and remanded all issues for trial.132 The appeal from the district 1court
3
decision in Warner Bros. was dismissed without prejudice. 1
VII.

Analysis

The major provisions of state statutes regulating motion
picture distribution readily separate into two categories: those
that are concerned with regulation of the bidding process (prohibition of blind bidding and bidding procedures), and those that
impose restraints on the terms of exhibition license agreements
(guarantees, advances, length of run). This analysis critiques the
differing rationales of the district court decisions in Allied Artists and Associated Film Distribution to determine whether
blind bidding statutes are constitutionally defective or are valid
trade regulations.
A.

First Amendment Guarantees of Freedom of Expression

The circuit court in Associated Film Distribution was correct in criticizing the trial court's analysis of the Pennsylvania
statute.M The trial court had decided that since the Pennsylvania Act was "more comprehensive [than the Ohio statute], it
must be judged by more rigorous standards than Ohio's comparatively limited regulation . . .,,8
". Assuming arguendo that a

more comprehensive statute requires a higher level of scrutiny,
such a distinction between the Pennsylvania and Ohio statutes
was incorrect. The Pennsylvania and Ohio statutes are identical
in their essential elements: the regulation of the bidding pro131. 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
132. Id. at 817. The court stated that it agreed with the analysis set forth by the
district court in Allied Artists, but found that it could not apply the analysis without
fact finding at trial. Id. See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the analysis used by the Allied Artists district court.
133. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981), dismissed
without prejudice, No. 81-1692 (10th Cir. March 5, 1982).
134. See supra notes 72-82, 132 and accompanying text.
135. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 979. See
supra notes 33-38 (Pennsylvania statute) and notes 39, 41 (Ohio statute).
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cess ' and the prohibition against blind bidding.' It was these
identical elements of the two statutes that caused a potentially
indirect impact on the distributors' freedom of expression, and
not those portions of the Pennsylvania Act that made it slightly
more restrictive in its control of licensing terms. Thus, the two
statutes should have received the same level of judicial scrutiny.
Having chosen the incorrect level of scrutiny, the district
court then found as a matter of law that no compelling state
interest existed that justified an indirect impact on the distributors' freedom of expression. 3 8 The cases chosen by the court to
demonstrate precedent for its selection of a high level of scrutiny and for finding the Pennsylvania statute constitutionally
defective on its face are not on point.3 9 None of the cases cited
by the court are concerned with the validity of statutes that regulate business practices between parties.
The proper line of cases for analyzing the Pennsylvania and
Ohio statutes are those dealing with regulation of trade where
there is a potential for indirect impact on freedom of expression.
Such a line of cases was correctly used by the district court in
Allied Artists for its analysis of the Ohio statute. 40 In essense,
those cases held that the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression was not absolute;' if a statute was regulatory
in nature and did not have the purpose of controlling the content of speech, then any incidental infringement of freedom of
expression must be balanced against a legitimate state interest
to determine whether the statute was constitutional. 142 These
are precisely the circumstances presented by the Pennsylvania
and Ohio statutes. Thus, the Allied Artists trial court applied

136. See supra notes 33-38 (Pennsylvania statute) and notes 39, 41 (Ohio statute).
137. See supra notes 34-38 (Pennsylvania statute) and notes 39, 41 (Ohio statute).
138. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. at 981. See
supra notes 75, 76 and accompanying text.
139. See cases cited supra note 77.
140. The district court in Allied Artists used the following cases to form the framework for its analysis of the Ohio statute: Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S.
36 (1961); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968). See
supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69 for a discussion of the nature of freedom of expression.
142. See supra note 66 for the balancing test established by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
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the correct analysis to Ohio's blind bidding statute and the correct level of scrutiny: one that balances Ohio's interest in regulating the motion picture distributors against the potential infringement of the distributors' freedom of expression.
B.

Copyright Preemption

The trial court in Associated Film Distributionfound that
since the Pennsylvania statute was more restrictive than the
Ohio statute regarding guarantees, advances, and length of run,
it impermissibly interferred with the distributor's right to license its films under the Copyright Act." '
The provisions used by the district court in Associated Film
Distribution to distinguish the Pennsylvania and Ohio statutes
should not have led to a finding of copyright preemption. The
Pennsylvania statute prohibits advances, while the Ohio statute prohibits advances prior to 14 days before the film is shown
to the public. 1"5 This difference was minimal, particularly in
light of the Allied Artists district court finding that "advances
rarely if ever were required . . . to be paid more than 14 days
before a motion picture was to be shown. '"1 6 The Pennsylvania

statute also prohibited guarantees if the distributor shared in a
percentage of the box office receipts. " The Ohio statute simply
prohibited the distributor from demanding a guarantee as a condition for granting a license where the distributor received a percentage of the box office receipts.1 4 8 The Pennsylvania statute is
more restrictive because it forces the distributor to choose between a guaranteed fixed price rental or a percentage of the box
office receipts. Both statutes, however, limit the distributors' unlimited discretion to demand guarantees and to receive a percentage of the box office receipts. The more restrictive Pennsylvania statute does not limit the copyright holder's ability to
license his films; the restriction merely prohibits the use of guar143. See supra notes 84 and 88 for the disputed sections of the Copyright Act. See
supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Associated Film Distribution district court analysis of the copyright preemption claim.
144. See supra note 35.
145. See supra note 39.
146. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 420.
147. See supra note 36.
148. See supra note 39.
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antees by the distributor as a device for shifting financial risk to
the exhibitor. " "
The portions of the Ohio statute prohibiting blind bidding
and regulating the bidding process have been upheld on appeal.1 These provisions are identical to the provisions in the
Pennsylvania statute. The district court in Associated Film Distributionhas been directed, on remand, to use the same analysis
employed by the district court in Allied Artists in interpreting
the Ohio statute. Thus, it is likely that the correct result reached
by the Allied Artists court will also be found by the Associated
Film Distributioncourt in a trial on the merits.
C.

Commerce Clause

The provisions of the Pennsylvania and Ohio statutes regulating the terms of the licensing agreement were discussed as being discriminatory towards and imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. 5 ' The commerce clause issue has been
remanded for further fact finding to the trial courts in Allied
Artists and Associated Film Distribution. The Allied Artists
district court was directed to consider the restraints on terms of
license agreements in the Ohio statute in light of the Supreme
Court analysis in Baldwin v. Seelig " and the tests set forth in
Pike v. Bruce Church." s Under Seelig, trade regulation to prevent deceptive trade practices was a valid state interest, but protecting the financial interest of an in-state business by providing
price security was not a valid state interest.'" The test in Pike
requires the trial court to first find a legitimate local interest,
and then assess the burden the activity places on interstate com-

149. The Allied Artists district court found that the primary purpose of guarantees
was to shift financial risk from the distributor to the exhibitor. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. at 418.
150. See supra note 130 for the specific portions of the Ohio statute that were upheld. See supra note 39 for text of statute.
151. See supra notes 109-116 and accompanying text.
152. 294 U.S. 511 (1935). Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d at 664.
153. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d at 665.
154. Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. at 523. The Supreme Court in Seelig held that state
regulation of interstate shipments of milk was permissible for health and safety, but
state regulation to insure price security was not a state interest under the commerce
clause. Id.
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merce. 15 The distributors' challenge to the Pennsylvania and
Ohio statutes in Associated Film Distributionand Allied Artists
should have been analyzed under Seelig and Pike because those
cases directly addressed state regulation of trade under the
Commerce Clause.
VIII.

Conclusion

Most states that have enacted statutes regulating motion
picture distribution practices have mandated bidding procedures
and have banned blind bidding. It is probable that those provisions will withstand constitutional and preemption challenges in
light of the reasoning of the federal district court in Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes. The degree to which a state may
restrict licensing terms is less clear. Unless the proponents of the
regulatory schemes can demonstrate more compelling reasons
for such restrictions, financial protection of in-state business will
not be sufficient to sustain state restriction of licensing terms.
Martin G. Anderson

155. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. at 142. The Supreme Court established the
following test in Pike v. Bruce Church:
Where the [challenged state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
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